Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. Bruce Bell & Associates, Inc., a Utah Corporation  : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. Bruce Bell & Associates,
Inc., a Utah Corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul H. Van Dyke; Elggren & Van Dyke; Attorney for Appellee.
Eric C. Olson, Douglas C. Tingey; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Outdoor Systems v. Bell, No. 900543 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2964
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BR!£F 
JTAH 
30CUME! 
KFU 
50 
DCOKET NO. 
^£0^3 ^ A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
BRUCE BELL & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 900543-CA 
Priority No. 16 
Appeal from Third Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Salt Lake Department, Judge Edward A. Watson 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Paul H. Van Dyke 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
Attorneys for Appellee 
261 East 300 South #175 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Eric C. Olson (4108) 
Douglas C. Tingey (5808) 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 South Main St., Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
f f ^ | Bsnteae fLesaa W*J 
MAR 2 9 1991 
Mary"» N^r-an 
Clerfc oS tnt u w r t 
Utah Court of 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
BRUCE BELL & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 900543-CA 
Priority No. 16 
Appeal from Third Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Salt Lake Department, Judge Edward A. Watson 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Paul H. Van Dyke 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
Attorneys for Appellee 
261 East 300 South #175 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Eric C. Olson (4108) 
Douglas C. Tingey (5808) 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 South Main St., Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
DEFINING THE DUTIES OF OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, IS 
ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW 5 
II. THERE WAS A FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION UNDER THE 
ADVERTISING AGREEMENT 6 
III. BELL HAD THE RIGHT TO AND DID TIMELY REPUDIATE 
THE ADVERTISING AGREEMENT 7 
IV. THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, GIVING ALL REASONABLE 
DOUBT TO OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, SHOWS THAT THE PARTIES 
ENTERED INTO THE ADVERTISING AGREEMENT BASED ON 
A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT 9 
CONCLUSION 13 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Bentlev v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984) 6 
Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins, Co., 699 P.2d 
688 (Utah 1985) 10, 12 
Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1982) 13 
Moonev v. G.R. & Associates, 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) 11 
Resource Mqmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 
1028 (Utah 1985) 8 
Robert Lanaston, Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) 12 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 13 
Other Authorities 
S. Williston, The Law of Contracts, S 619 (3d ed. 1961) . 7 
ii 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An unusual situation has arisen in this case. The 
prevailing party in the trial court, Outdoor Systems, Inc. 
("Outdoor Systems"), is now attempting to disregard or rewrite 
the facts as found by the trial court to justify the trial 
court's Conclusions of Law. Appellant Bruce Bell & Associates, 
Inc. ("Bell") agrees that the trial court's conclusions are not 
supported by the trial court's findings, and it is for that 
reason that the trial court must be reversed. 
Outdoor Systems insists that the trial court's findings 
leave some doubt as to whether the billboard provided under the 
Advertising Agreement that is the subject of this action was 
sufficiently visible from Interstate 19 to communicate the 
advertising message. All of the evidence and findings were to 
the contrary of Outdoor Systems' position: (a) Outdoor Systems' 
representative Stephen Brossart testified that the graphics on 
the sign were "not readily seen." (Finding No. 32. )l (Mr. 
Brossart further testified that Bell and its client did not get 
the full value of their money for the sign provided. [Trial 
xThe Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are found at 
Record No. 56-65. As in the Brief of Appellant, each reference 
herein to this pleading will be to a specific numerical paragraph 
of the "Findings" or "Conclusions." A copy of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law was submitted as an addendum to the 
Brief of Appellant. 
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Transcript p. 63].) (b) The trial court further found that Larry 
Pinnock drove by the sign three times, after the sign was in 
place, and could not see the sign on the drive-bys. (Finding No. 
33.) (The evidence shows that on these occasions Mr. Pinnock was 
actually looking for the sign. [Trial Transcript p. 70].) (c) 
The court further found that the sign was approximately 200 yards 
from the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lane of 
traffic on Interstate 19. (Finding No. 33.) (d) Outdoor Systems 
has pointed to absolutely no evidence presented that the 
billboard was sufficiently visible from Interstate 19 to 
effectively carry an advertising message. 
Outdoor Systems makes much of the "approval" of the 
sign by Kino Springs. Yet, there was no evidence that the person 
conducting the "drive-by" had any expertise with which to 
evaluate the suitability of the sign as an advertising medium. 
Stephen Brossart, Outdoor Systems' representative, specifically 
testified at trial that no one ever indicated to him that the 
person sent from Kino Springs to view the board had any 
advertising expertise such as Brossart had. (Testimony of 
Stephen Brossart, Trial Transcript pp. 48-49.) 
Nonetheless, Outdoor Systems takes great pains to 
construe this "drive-by" by someone with no advertising 
experience as blanket "approval" of the sign. (It is interesting 
to note that Outdoor Systems' pains are for no real purpose—none 
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of its legal or factual theories are based on any such 
"approval.") However, any "approval" must be seen in its factual 
context. A "drive-by" by someone with absolutely no advertising 
experience cannot be said to be blanket and unqualified 
"approval" of .the sign. The most that occurred was that the 
viewer verified that the sign existed in a particular geographic 
location vis-a-vis Kino Springs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court in this matter based its 
conclusions on the erroneously narrow interpretation that the 
duties of Outdoor Systems under the Advertising Agreement were 
only to execute and affix art work to a billboard. The 
Advertising Agreement was, however, just what its name states—a 
contract centered on Advertising. Outdoor Systems was selling 
advertising space, not just the services of affixing art work to 
a billboard. The trial court's interpretation is not supported 
by the facts it found or well established legal principles and 
Outdoor Systems has made no attempt to support the trial court's 
interpretation. 
2. All of the evidence and the findings of the trial 
court show that it is undisputed that the billboard leased by 
Outdoor Systems to Bell could not be read from Interstate 19. 
Bell, therefore, did not receive the intended consideration under 
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the Advertising Agreement. A material failure of consideration 
occurred. The trial court's conclusions to the contrary are 
based on erroneous legal principles and not supported by the 
facts found by the trial court. 
3. Paragraph 10 of the Advertising Agreement places 
duties on both parties to the agreement. Bell fulfilled his 
duties by notifying Outdoor Systems of a defect in the sign—the 
objective fact that it could not be read by travelers along 
Interstate 19. Contrary to the parties duties under paragraph 
10, Outdoor Systems refused to correct the defect unless Bell 
bore the cost. At this point Bell was entitled to take the only 
option remaining to it—to repudiate the contract. That is what 
Bell did. The trial court's interpretation of the Advertising 
Agreement is error as a matter of law and must be reversed. 
4. This case is a clear example of a mutual mistake 
of fact. The Advertising Agreement was entered into by both 
parties on the assumption that the subject billboard could 
function as a suitable advertising medium. The undisputed facts 
found by the trial court are that the board could not so 
function. The parties were mistaken as to a material fact. The 
trial court's conclusions to the contrary are based on erroneous 
legal principles and not supported by the facts it found. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
DEFINING THE DUTIES OF OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, IS 
ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Outdoor Systems makes no effort in its brief to address 
the deficiencies in the trial court's first conclusion of law 
regarding the scope of Outdoor Systems' duties under the 
Advertising Agreement. This erroneous conclusion is the basis of 
all other conclusions by the trial court. Outdoor Systems 
continues to contend that its duties under the Advertising 
Agreement consisted of nothing more than to execute art work and 
affix it to a billboard. In at least one moment of candor, 
however, Outdoor Systems specifically admits that its duties 
extended beyond painting a billboard when it stated: "The 
consideration for the contract included Outdoor's promise to 
paint and maintain an outdoor painted bulletin for a period of 
twelve months. . . . " Brief of Appellee, p. 6 (emphasis added). 
If one reads both the first page and the second page of 
the Advertising Agreement, it is clear that Outdoor Systems was a 
lessor of billboard advertising space as well as a painter and 
affixer. These two roles were not separable but rather they ran 
together as the full package of what was sold to Bell. To 
ascertain whether there was a failure of consideration, a mutual 
mistake, or a defect in performance, the court must look at the 
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entirety of what Outdoor Systems sold to Bell under the 
Advertising Agreement. In closing its eyes to Outdoor Systems' 
role as a lessor in Conclusion No. 1, the trial court committed 
error. Outdoor Systems' failure to offer any support for that 
conclusion simply underscores the existence of that error. 
II. THERE WAS A FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION UNDER THE 
ADVERTISING AGREEMENT. 
Bell has challenged both conclusions of law regarding 
failure of consideration. Outdoor Systems again has failed to 
address the error in the trial court's conclusions. Outdoor 
Systems appears to agree with Bell that materiality is the 
correct legal standard for evaluating an alleged failure of 
consideration. Brief of Appellee, pp. 5-6, citing Bentlev v. 
Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984) (also cited by Bell in its 
brief). Yet, Outdoor Systems makes no attempt to defend the 
trial court's erroneous legal conclusion that for a party to be 
"without fault" it must be free of all negligence. 
What Outdoor Systems does argue is that, under the 
trial court's constricted interpretation of the Advertising 
Agreement, there could be no failure of consideration because all 
that was promised was to paint and maintain the sign. For 
Outdoor Systems, this assertion—which should be a starting 
premise for discussion—is the final word. Yet, this contention 
clearly bypasses the fundamental inquiry in any attempt at 
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contract interpretation of ascertaining "the prime object and 
purpose of the parties." 4 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts. § 
619, p. 733 (3d ed. 1961). The prime object of the Advertising 
Agreement was more than the executing and affixing of some art 
work to a billboard. It included the lease of a billboard, to 
which the art work was to be affixed, in a location that could be 
seen by its intended audience—travelers on Interstate 19. There 
is no dispute that Bell did not receive the intended 
consideration. There was a material failure of consideration and 
the trial court committed error as a matter of law in concluding 
otherwise. 
III. BELL HAD THE RIGHT TO AND DID TIMELY REPUDIATE THE 
ADVERTISING AGREEMENT. 
Outdoor Systems has misconstrued the position of Bell 
regarding the effect of paragraph 10 of the Advertising 
Agreement. Contrary to Outdoor System's assertions, Bell does 
not claim that paragraph 10 gave Bell "an unlimited right to 
terminate the contract if it found that the advertising was not 
effective." Brief of Appellee, p. 15. 
Paragraph 10 in Outdoor Systems' standard contract 
required Bell to "inspect the display within [blank] days after 
installation." It further provided that unless Bell, within the 
number of days specified, notified Outdoor Systems of any defect, 
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the display would conclusively be presumed to have been inspected 
and approved for all purposes. 
The trial court specifically held that Bell notified 
Outdoor Systems of the defect in the sign within any applicable 
time limits. (Conclusion No. 4.) Bell even proposed a way to 
cure the defect—re-painting the sign as all graphics. (Finding 
No. 26.) Outdoor Systems, however, refused to take any steps to 
cure the defect unless Bell would bear the cost of the re-
painting. At this point Bell had only one option—rejection of 
the contract. 
Paragraph 10 did not give Bell an unlimited right to 
repudiate the contract nor does Bell so contend. The defect in 
question was objective in nature. No one disputes that the 
sign's graphics could not be seen. It is little comfort to have 
a lovely picture on a billboard with indecipherable garaphics. 
Outdoor Systems was timely notified of this objective defect in 
the sign. Yet, Outdoor Systems refused to take any steps to 
correct the defect unless Bell bore the cost. The only 
reasonable interpretation of paragraph 10 is that at that point, 
with Outdoor Systems refusing to cure, Bell was entitled to 
repudiate the contract. That is exactly what Bell did. 
Outdoor Systems' reliance on Resource Mcrmt. Co. v. 
Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985), dealing with an absolute 
right to repudiate a contract, is misplaced. There was nothing 
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"absolute and arbitrary" about Bell's rejection. The objective 
fact was that the board in place did not advertise. This was a 
most fundamental "defect." The trial court erred, as a matter of 
law, in concluding that Bell did not have the right to repudiate 
the Advertising Agreement on the facts the trial court found. 
IV. THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, GIVING ALL REASONABLE 
DOUBT TO OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, SHOWS THAT THE PARTIES 
ENTERED INTO THE ADVERTISING AGREEMENT BASED ON A 
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
The parties entered into an Advertising Agreement. By 
the name of the agreement, the parties declared the central 
purpose of this contract to be "Advertising." Outdoor Systems' 
representative acknowledged at trial that the basic purpose and 
goal of "advertising" is to grab the attention of the potential 
customer and then to convey a message to that potential customer. 
(Testimony of Stephen Brossart, Trial Transcript p. 36.) Both 
parties clearly thought, at the time they entered into the 
Advertising Agreement, that the sign proposed by Outdoor Systems 
could grab the attention of potential customers traveling along 
Interstate 19 and could convey a message to such travelers 
regarding Kino Springs Golf Course. The facts found by the trial 
court, however, establish that both parties were mistaken and 
that the location of the Outdoor Systems billboard made it 
impossible for it to function effectively as an advertising 
medium. 
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Outdoor Systems claims that no mutual mistake of fact 
occurred because Bell "assumed the risk" as to a future event. 
However, the location and size of the board were objective facts, 
not "future events." Outdoor Systems did not set any limitations 
on what could be placed on the board and Bell did not agree to 
any. Of course, Bell "assumed the risk" that the specific layout 
and format of advertisement that Bell prepared would not be 
sufficiently engaging to grab the attention of passing motorists 
and convey a message about the desirability of stopping at Kino 
Springs Golf Course. But there is no evidence or legal principle 
on which to base the proposition that Bell "assumed the risk" 
that the billboard leased to carry that advertisement would not 
be visible from Interstate 19. Rather, Bell entered into the 
Advertising Agreement specifically to acquire an advertising 
medium that could convey a message to Interstate 19 travelers. 
Both parties were mistaken and neither Bell nor Outdoor Systems 
"assumed the risk" that the board could not function as an 
advertising medium. 
Outdoor Systems' reliance on Blackhurst v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that Bell 
"assumed the risk" of the visibility of the sign in misplaced. 
The court in Blackhurst held that the parties to a personal 
injury settlement agreement assumed the risk of an uncertainty— 
future changes in the injured party's health. In contrast, no 
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relevant facts regarding the billboard location changed or could 
have changed after the parties entered into the Advertising 
Agreement. The physical location of the billboard did not 
change. The location of Interstate 19 did not change. These 
were not uncertainties or variables. At the time the parties 
entered into the Advertising Agreement both parties reasonably 
assumed the objective fact that the billboard would be a suitable 
advertising medium. It was not. A mutual mistake occurred. 
Outdoor Systems similarly mischaracterizes the facts in 
labeling Bell's use of the sign as a "prediction." Brief of 
Appellee, p. 11. Moonev v. G.R. & Associates, 746 P.2d 1174 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), offers Outdoor Systems no comfort or 
support. In Moonev, the obligor on a promissory note sought to 
avoid liability because the note was entered on the erroneous 
belief that, after the making of the note, a security interest 
would be filed collateralizing the note. Like the settling 
parties in Blackhurst, the Moonev obligor "assumed the 
occurrence of a future event—a variable that was by no means a 
certainty. The court held that no mutual mistake of fact 
occurred because any mistake was as to an event to occur in the 
future. TA. at 1178. 
The Advertising Agreement was not entered on the 
assumption that some event would occur in the future. At the 
time of entering into the Advertising Agreement, it was assumed 
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by both parties that the billboard could function as an 
advertising medium. No prediction of the future was involved. 
No future event was contemplated by the parties that would effect 
the billboard's ability to function as an advertising medium. A 
mutual mistake did occur and Moonev is inapposite. 
Outdoor Systems also relies on Robert Langston, Ltd. v. 
McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and in so doing 
undermines its earlier arguments. In contrast to Moonev and 
Blackhurst, Langston is a classic case of mutual mistake. Both 
parties to a contract were mistaken as to an objective fact—the 
number of cattle existing on the ranch that was the subject of 
the buy-sell contract. The court rescinded the contract. As in 
Langston, the parties in this action made a mistake regarding an 
objective fact, i.e., the fact that a sign 200 yards from the 
point of optimal viewing cannot advertise. 
Outdoor Systems resurrects the trial court's "at fault" 
analysis with respect to mutual mistake. Outdoor Systems seems 
to claim that Bell erred when it chose not to have lettering the 
full height and width of the board. No doubt, block letters the 
full height of the billboard saying "GOLF" vould have been more 
visible from a distance than even two lines of lettering. But, 
as Outdoor Systems fully acknowledged at trial, effective 
advertising must grab the potential customer's attention and 
convey the desired message. Bell, with Outdoor Systems' input, 
designed an advertisement that would do just that but the board 
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was not a sufficient vehicle for the message. (There is no 
suggestion that the advertisement designed by Bell was unusual or 
extraordinary in any way.)2 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Conclusions of Law in this matter are 
based on erroneous legal principles and at variance with its own 
Findings of Fact. Appellant Bruce Bell & Associates, Inc. 
respectfully requests that this court reverse the judgment of the 
trial court, direct judgment to be entered for appellant, and 
award costs on appeal and attorneys' fees pursuant to the 
Advertising Agreement and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 to 
appellant. 
DATED this 2*P day of March, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By yh^> -—*/ ^>^p 
s£rtf6 t . Olson/ 
Douglas C. Ting^y 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant Bruce Bell & 
Associates, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
2
 Outdoor Systems' citation to Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 
P.2d 9 (Utah 1982) is puzzling. Certainly, the seller's mistake 
as to the legal effect of a mortgage on the land in Kiahtipes 
bears no resemblance to the clear mistake of objective fact 
proven in the present action. 
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